ON THE WAY FROM MARXISM TO PHILOSOPHY. M. A. LIFSHITZ AND G. W. F. HEGEL

Abstract

The first part of the article demonstrates the duality of the assessment of Hegel's philosophy in the early works of M. A. Lifshitz, on the one hand, accentuating the historical limitations of the great idealist's thought, and on the other hand, finding in it one of the main sources of Marxist dialectics. Hegel's philosophy, according to the early Lifshitz, was only an abstraction of movement, because of its idealism alien to its substantial side-matter in General and understanding the role of class contradictions in particular. In this regard, Lifshitz's interest in this period is mainly directed to the formulation of the laws of motion in it. In the second part of the article it is shown that the desire of Lifshitz in the Mature period of his work to solve the problem of objectivity and cognizability of truth on the ways of materialism shifts the emphasis in his assessment of Hegel's absolute idealism and significantly brings his own position closer to that of the latter. Lifshitz's interest is now mainly attracted by the content of the "real" part of Hegel's system. "Classic shapes" created, according to ethnozoology Lifshitz, movement of matter, find their equivalent in the "ideas" of the German classic. In the third part of the article problematisizes materialist concept of matter and the thesis about the philosophical failure of the attempts to construct a materialist philosophy. The final part concludes about the particular scientific nature of Marxist research. In the Mature works of Lifshitz philosophical aspirations of Marxism be resolved through clarification of the ideal-the true nature of the elements, which prevents further its unilateral interpretation of how matter and believes the border between often Marxist science studies and the philosophy.